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INTRODUCTION

The Securities Exchange Act of 19341 created the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and vested it with broad regulatory
and enforcement powers. While one of the purposes of the Act is to
protect investors, 2 the SEC has long recognized that it lacks the

resources to fully accomplish that goal. 3 Consequently, plaintiffs

injured by actions in violation of the Act have sought remedies in
the federal courts that have been willing to imply private rights of
action under the securities laws.4 Recently, however, the Supreme
Court has indicated that it will restrict the scope of remedies available to private litigants, thus creating confusion about implication,5
particularly in the field of securities. Despite this trend, the Second
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976).
2. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); text accompanying notes 1820 infra.
3. See note 99 infra.
4. See note 41 infra.
5. The term "implication" is used here to describe the judicial process of finding a right
of action in favor of plaintiffs under statutes that do not expressly provide a private remedy.
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Circuit has recently implied a remedy in favor of private litigants
under two securities statutes that previously had not been read to
create a right of action.' This apparent conflict between the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit underlines existing uncertainty
concerning the continued availability of implied remedies and emphasizes the need for a sound analytical framework within which
courts can produce consistent results in implication. This Recent
Development will review implication in the securities area, focusing
on the most recent Second Circuit decision7 creating an implied
remedy under section 17 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
analyzing the scope of that remedy and its impact on potential
private litigants.
I.

A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Standards for Implication

The Supreme Court first indicated the existence of implied
private rights of action in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby,'
when it held that a railroad employee injured by railroad equipment
that did not meet the standards of the Federal Safety Appliance
Act 9 had a cause of action against the railroad, despite the fact that
the Act did not expressly provide a private remedy.'" The Court
stated that when disregard of a statutory command results in damage to a party "for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,
the right to recover the damages from the party in default is implied
....
"' This principle suggested that a federal private right of
action might be implied for anyone injured as a result of a statutory
violation.' 2 Although the rule announced in Rigsby swept broadly,
it was not applied extensively by the federal courts until recently.' 3
6. See Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,404
(2d Cir. April 21, 1978); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
98 S. Ct. 2253 (1978).
7. Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,404 (2d
Cir. April 21, 1978).
8. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
9. Federal Safety Appliance Act, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (1893) (current version at 45
U.S.C. §§ 1-43 (Supp. V 1975)).
10. In its analysis the Court relied on a proviso in § 4 of the 1910 amendment to the
Act, ch. 160, 36 Stat. 298, which stated that nothing in the section shall be construed to relieve
a carrier from liability in any remedial action for the death or injury to any railroad employee
caused by equipment that is either defective or otherwise not in accordance with the specifications of the Safety Appliance Act. 241 U.S. at 39-40.
11. Id. at 39.
12. The principle has since been adopted by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 286
(1965).
13. The best known of the few early implied cases include Tunstall v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir.
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Thus federal courts had little opportunity to develop a more practicable analytical framework for determining whether private remedies could be implied under federal statutes not expressly providing
them. For a time the Court indicated that implied remedies might
be restricted to statutes manifesting congressional intent to provide
a private right of action," but it reversed this trend in the landmark
decision of JI. Case Co. v. Borak.'5
Plaintiff in Borak was a shareholder seeking relief under section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19346 for damages resulting
from a merger accomplished by the circulation of allegedly false and
17
misleading proxy information. Noting that section 27 of the Act
grants the district courts jurisdiction over "all suits in equity and
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created"
under the Act, the Court concluded that private parties are entitled
to bring suit for conduct allegedly violative of section 14(a). 11 The
Court reviewed the legislative history of section 14(a) and determined that although the section makes no reference to a private
right of action, the chief purpose of the Act is the protection of
investors, "which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief
where necessary to achieve that result."' 9 The Court further observed that when private enforcement of SEC rules provides a necessary supplement to the Commission action, the courts have a duty
to make such remedies available as are necessary to implement
congressional purposes. 0 This emphasis on congressional purpose
was expanded in Allen v. State Board of Elections,2 '1 in which the
Court held that private plaintiffs may invoke the jurisdiction of
federal courts to enforce section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.22
1947); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Neiswonger v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 35 F.2d 761 (N.D. Ohio 1929).
14. 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 454, 457-58 (1968). See also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647,
651-52 (1963); T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464,471 (1959); Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
15. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976)(§ 14(a) makes it unlawful for any person to solicit or permit
the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any registered
security in violation of rules and regulations promulgated by the SEC under § 12).
17. Id. § 78aa.
18. 377 U.S. at 430-31.
19. Id. at 432.
20. Id. at 433.
21. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (Supp. V 1975). This section provides that if a state covered by
the Voting Rights Act passes any "voting qualifications or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November
1, 1964," no person can be deprived of his right to vote for failure to comply with the new
enactment unless and until the state seeks and receives a declaratory judgment in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia that the new enactment "does not have
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The Allen Court stated that private litigants must be allowed a right
of action in order to effectuate the broad purpose of the Act to secure
voting rights for all persons. 23 Recognizing the potentially broad
reach of the approach taken in Allen, 24 however, the Court attempted to develop a more rigorous analytical framework for determining the existence of private rights of action in statutes silent on
the subject in two leading cases: National RailroadPassengerCorp.
v. NationalAssociation of RailroadPassengers(Amtrak)25 and Cort
v. Ash.28
In Amtrak the National Association of Railroad Passengers
brought suit to enjoin the discontinuance of certain passenger rail
routes, alleging that the discontinuance would violate the Amtrak
Act.27 In denying relief, the Court relied upon the principle of statutory construction stating that when the express language and history of a statute provide exclusive remedies for its violation, no
additional private rights may be implied." Thus, after extensive
review of the legislative history of the Amtrak Act, the Court determined that section 307(a) created a public right of action in the
Attorney General and that the only private right of action contemplated by the Act was expressly limited to labor disputes. 2' Amtrak
therefore established a presumption against implication when a
remedial scheme is expressly provided by Congress, rebuttable only
by a showing of affirmative congressional intent to provide a private
remedy.' Although Amtrak failed to develop a rigid test defining
when a private cause of action should be implied, it narrowed the
scope of inquiry by suggesting three guiding factors: legislative history, congressional purpose, and tenets of statutory construction.
the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account
of race or color."
23. 393 U.S. at 556-57.
24. See generally 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 53, 58 (1975) (pointing out that if this
kind of approach was literally followed it would almost always justify implying a remedy).
25. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
26. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
27. 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-644 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The Act prohibited a railroad from
discontinuing intercity passenger service prior to January 1, 1975, unless it entered into a
contract with Amtrak pursuant to § 561(a)(1). Once a contract was entered into, however,
the railroad could discontinue the service by filing a 30-day notice of intent. Id. § 564(a)
(Supp. V 1975).
28. 414 U.S. at 458.
29. Id. at 457. The Court was also influenced by the fact that Congress specifically
envisioned elimination of certain rail routes, the precise matter challenged by plaintiff, noting
that implying a private remedy would undercut one of the purposes of the Act. Id. at 461-62.
30. See Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implications
for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1392, 1402 (1975).
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In Cort v. Ash 31 plaintiff-shareholders brought suit against a
corporate director for alleged violations of the Federal Election
Campaign Act.2 In an effort to further develop and clarify the implication analysis, the Court identified four criteria relevant in determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted," .
that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of
the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? . . . Third, is it

consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such
a remedy for the plaintiff?. . . And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so
that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law?"

The Court found that none of the criteria were met, emphasizing
that the Federal Elections Commission was charged with exclusive
enforcement of the challenged statute and that the remedy sought
would not further the primary congressional objective.3 Although
the Ash criteria provide a useful focus on questions that must be
resolved before a private remedy may be implied under a federal
statute, they fail to develop a rigorous test for implication. The
relative significance of each of the criteria is undefined, and the
Court's analysis failed to indicate whether all four must be met
before a private remedy will be implied.3 5 Thus, while Borak,
Amtrak, and Ash provide federal courts with a number of factors to
consider in determining whether a statute provides for an implied
right of action, no guidance has been given regarding the proper
application of those factors.
31. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
32. Federal Election Campaign Act, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 723 (1948)(current version at 2
U.S.C. § 441b (1976)) (making it unlawful for a corporation to make a contribution or an
expenditure in connection with any presidential or vice presidential election).
33. 422 U.S. at 78 (emphasis in original). Regarding the first criterion, the Court noted
that when a right of action has been found there has generally been a clearly articulated
federal right in the plaintiff (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S.
388 (1971)), or a pervasive legislative scheme governing the relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant (citing Borak). 422 U.S. at 82.
34. Id. at 74-76, 80-84.
35. Commentators have suggested that there is little that is new in the Ash test, save
for the last criterion, indicating that the first factor expresses the same concern as the congressional purpose analysis of Borak, and that the second and third are restatements of Amtrak.
17 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Ray. 53, 62 (1975). See also Note, Private Causes of Action Under
Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 74 MICH. L. REv. 308 (1975).
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B. Implied Remedies Under the Securities Laws
Until recently, the federal securities laws have been a fertile
source of implied private rights of actions although these statutes
are regulatory in function and provide only criminal sanctions. In
the leading decision of Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.3" the district
court implied a private remedy under section 10(b)37 and rule 10b51 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, emphasizing the broad
purpose of the 1934 Act to regulate securities transactions, protect
investors, and eliminate fraudulent conduct. Noting the absence of
a specific statutory denial of a private remedy, the court supported
its holding under tort39 and contract 0 theories. This decision served
as the basis on which lower federal courts found implied private
actions under the securities statutes41 until the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak. 42 The Court's
subsequent recognition of an implied private remedy under section
10(b),13 coupled with Kardon, vastly increased judicial recognition
of plaintiffs' rights under that section."
36. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.
38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977) makes it unlawful:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
39. 69 F. Supp. at 513-14. The court reasoned that § 10(b) created federal rights, the
violation of which was actionable under tort law.
40. Id. at 514. Section 29(b) of the Act provides that contracts in violation of any
provision of the Act shall be void. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1976).
41. A partial list of securities law provisions under which courts have implied private
remedies may be found in Franklin Nat'l Bank v. L.B. Meadows & Co., 318 F. Supp. 1339,
1341-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
42. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See text accompanying notes 15-20 supra.
43. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 156-57 (1972) (material
misrepresentation of seller's shares); Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6, 13-14 (1971) (scheme to purchase shares with ultimately worthless assets).
44. Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws:
The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891, 892 (1977). Lowenfels attributes this growth to
expansion of the substantive scope of § 10(b) via recognition of novel causes of action. See
id. at 892 n.3 (collection of cases recognizing implied rights of action under securities laws).
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In a recent series of decisions under the securities laws, however, the Supreme Court has demonstrated an intent to restrict the
availability of implied private rights of action. The Court has justified this retrenchment with a number of different rationales. For
example, in Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour45 customers of a failing broker-dealer sought to compel SIPC to discharge
its obligations under the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA).11
In refusing to imply a private remedy for plaintiffs, the Court determined that Congress had manifestly intended that enforcement of
SIPA be restricted to the SIPC and had provided that only the
Securities Exchange Commission could compel SIPC to act. The
Court thus concluded that a private action was incompatible with
the overall regulatory scheme created by SIPA.4 7 The BarbourCourt
distinguished Borak on the grounds that SIPA, unlike the 1934
Act,"s does not contain any "standards of conduct that a private
action could help to enforce" nor any "general grant of jurisdiction
to the district courts."' Similarly, the Court distinguished Alien 0
by stressing that unlike the Voting Rights Act, SIPA does not impose "such burdens on the parties charged with its administration"
that Congress would have intended supplemental enforcement by
private parties. 5' Despite these arguments, Barbour remains the
only recent case in which the Court clearly refused to imply a pri52
vate right of action under a particular securities statute.
While complete denial of implied securities law remedies is
thus rare, the Court has strongly indicated that it will restrict the
scope of existing causes of action by strictly construing those securities statutes under which implied remedies have been previously
recognized. Three specific cases demonstrate the Court's emphasis
on the substantive elements and scope of a cause of action that has
45. 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-111 (1976). SIPC was created by SIPA in order to protect
customers of failing brokers. Id. § 78eee. The House report accompanying SIPA noted that
serious and persistent financial difficulties of broker-dealers lead to loss of investor funds and
confidence. H.R. REP. No. 1613, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5255, 5255.
47. 421 U.S. at 420-21. The Court also stressed that allowing a customer to bring an
action to compel liquidation of a firm could prove fatal to that firm, which might have met
its difficulties through less drastic means. Id. at 421-23.
48. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
49. 421 U.S. at 424.
50. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
51. 421 U.S. at 425.
52. In Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), the Court refused to imply a
private remedy in favor of a class held not to be protected, but explicitly left open the question
whether the class protected under the statute has an implied cause of action, stressing the
limited nature of its holding. Id. at 42 n.28. See text accompanying notes 71-74 infra.
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already been implied. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 3 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari "to resolve the question whether a private
cause of action for damages will lie under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 in
the absence of any allegation of 'scienter'-intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."5 4 Customers of a brokerage firm brought suit
under section 10(b) against the firm's accountants on a negligence
theory-failure to discover fraudulent practices of the broker. While
the Court agreed that rule 10b-5 imposes a duty on accountants, 55
it nonetheless barred the plaintiffs' claim on the ground that private
actions for damages under section 10(b) must allege scienter 5 The
Court purported to base its holding solely on the language of the
statute and rule and the accompanying legislative and administrative history, insofar as it clarified the meaning of the statutory wording, declining to consider the policy and purpose underlying the
statute.57 Hochfelder clearly increases the burden on plaintiffs seeking to state a cause of action under section 10(b), restricting litigant
58
access to federal courts and discouraging strike suits.
The Court extended this strict constructionist approach to
analysis of congressional purpose in Santa Fe Industries v. Green."
Plaintiff-shareholders brought a section 10(b) claim alleging a
breach of fiduciary duty by the majority shareholder in effecting a
merger, but made no allegations of deceit or manipulation. The
Court first noted that a claim alleging mere breach of fiduciary duty
is insufficient under the express language of section 10(b).11 The
Court then applied the Ash criteria, finding the third and fourth
factors unsatisfied. Since fairness of a transaction was only a tangential concern of section 10(b), implying a remedy would be inconsistent with the legislative scheme. Furthermore, since existing
53. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
54. Id. at 193.
55. The origin of the duty imposed on accountants remains unclear because the Court
did not discuss the Seventh Circuit's holding on that issue. The Seventh Circuit found that
the accounting firm owed a duty to plaintiffs by basing its interpretation of rule 10b-5 on the
broad policy requirements of § 17 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a5 (1976), and SEC Release No. 3338 (Nov. 28, 1942), issued pursuant to that rule. Bucklo,
The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule lOb-5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STA. L. REV. 213, 216 n.21 (1977).
56. 425 U.S. at 193.
57. Id. at 214 n.33. The Court focused on the term "manipulative," reasoning that it is
a word of art connoting intentional or willful conduct, not negligence. Id. at 199.
58. Lowenfels, supra note 44, at 899. "The thrust of Hochfelder is narrow, strict constructionist, and defendant oriented. The words and construction of the relevant statute are
decisive. Legislative history is also relevant. Policy arguments, however, have no place in this
vital holding." Id. at 900.
59. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).

60. Id. at 472-74.
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state corporation law provided adequate relief to plaintiffs, an implied right of action was unnecessary to effectuate congressional
purpose.' It is interesting to note that although the Hochfelder
decision was sufficiently narrow to obviate the need for further supportive rationale, the Court felt compelled to reach the issue
whether an implied right of action to enforce fair transactions exists
under section 10(b). Thus the holding in Santa Fe represents a
conscious effort to limit expansion of implied remedies under 10(b).
In Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.62 plaintiff corporation sought
injunctive relief based on an alleged violation of section 13(d) of the
1934 Act.6 3 The Court noted that even when a private remedy has
been implied, plaintiffs must still establish irreparable harm and
the other prerequisites for obtaining equitable relief."4 Examining
the purpose of section 13(d) the Court concluded that "none of the
evils to which the Williams Act was directed has occurred or is
threatened in this case.""
The Court has also indicated that it will strictly adhere to statutory standing requirements before sustaining an implied cause of
action under the securities laws. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores" plaintiffs charged that they were purposely dissuaded
from purchasing securities by an overly pessimistic appraisal of defendant's business and sought relief under section 10(b). The Court
ruled that a private damages action under rule 10b-5 is restricted
to actual purchasers or sellers of securities, 7 noting that when Congress has created remedies for others than purchasers it has done so
expressly. 8 The Court also recognized the increased opportunity for
vexatious litigation and strike suits for speculative damages should
standing requirements not be rigidly enforced." Although such re61. Id. at 477.
62. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976). Section 13(d) requires anyone who acquires a 5% or
greater share of a class of stock to file reports with the SEC revealing the identity of persons
for whom the purchases were made, the source of the funds used to make the purchases, the
purpose of the acquisitions, the number of shares owned, and any information regarding
arrangements with other persons relating to such purchases.
64. 422 U.S. at 64-65.
65. Id. at 59. The Court carefully noted that it has not hesitated to imply a private
remedy "when to do so is consistent with the legislative scheme and necessary for the protection of investors as a supplement to enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission." Id. at 62.
66. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
67. The purchaser or seller requirement was first expressed in Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
68. 421 U.S. at 734 (citing § 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976), which
allows issuer to recover insider profits).
69. 421 U.S. at 739-42.
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strictions doubtlessly exclude some meritorious claims by persons
intended to be protected under section 10(b), 0 the purchaser or
seller requirement provides a necessary and workable standing criterion to potential litigants by restricting implied rights of actions
to plaintiffs who can make a tangible showing of actual injury.
A focus on the first Ash factor-limiting implied remedies to
the class of persons sought to be protected by a statute-underlined
the Court's decision in Piper v. Chris-CraftIndustries., Plaintiff
was a tender offeror who brought a claim under section 14(e) of the
1934 Act.72 In holding that a tender offeror has no implied cause of
action under section 14(e), the Court initially emphasized that Congress sought to protect only the shareholders of a target corporation,
not tender offerors.7 3 The Court went on to apply the remaining Ash
factors, finding that none warranted implying a private remedy and
that existing state laws should supply the appropriate remedy.74 In
view of the Court's holding concerning the scope of intended congressional protection,75 it is unclear why the remaining Ash criteria
were discussed at all. Once the Court determined that plaintiff was
not "of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, 76 it need not have applied the remaining factors of Ash,
which seek to determine whether the statute contemplates an implied right of action at all, rather than whether such an action might
lie in favor of the plaintiff.
The problems encountered by the Court in Chris-Crafthighlight the difficulties inherent in a mechanical application of the Ash
analysis. A court confronted with a plaintiff seeking relief under a
statute that does not expressly provide a remedy must resolve three
separate but overlapping questions. First, can a private right of
action ever be implied under the statute, the issue facing the Court
in Barbour. Second, does the plaintiff have standing to bring such
an action, the problem present in Blue Chip and Chris-Craft.
Third, assuming that an implied remedy exists, is the claim asserted by plaintiff within the scope of the right of action that may
70. Lowenfels, supra note 44, at 896.
71. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). Section 14(e) makes unlawful "any fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer... or any solicitation
of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer. .. ."
73. The Court observed that "a party whose. . . conduct was purposefully brought
under federal control by the statute . . . can scarcely lay claim to the status of 'beneficiary'
whom Congress considered in need of protection." 430 U.S. at 37.
74. Id. at 38-41.
75. See note 52 supra.
76. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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be implied, the focus of Hochfelder, Mosinee Paper,and Santa Fe.
The Ash analysis is relevant primarily to the first question,77 although the "class to be protected" factor is useful in considering the
standing issue as well. The failure to distinguish clearly between
these three issues has led to inappropriate application of the Ash
analysis in cases such as Santa Fe 8 in which an implied right of
action was previously found to exist. The better approach would be
to utilize the analyses suggested in Borak, Amtrak, and Ash only to
determine whether a private right of action exists under a particular
statute. Once this initial determination is made, an application of
the relevant statutory standing requirements and substantive limits
on the scope of the cause of action is appropriate. This distinction
between the existence of a right of action and the parameters of that
action demonstrates that although recent Supreme Court decisions
substantially curtail the scope of remedies available to private litigants, 79 they by no means foreclose the possibility of implying private rights of action under the securities laws.
III.

RECENT TREATMENT OF IMPLICATION BY

LOWER

FEDERAL COURTS

In three recent cases the Second Circuit has addressed the
problem of implying a private remedy under the securities laws. In
0 the receiver of a liquidated
Lank v. New York Stock Exchange"
stock exchange member sought damages on behalf of the member
corporation allegedly sustained as a result of the exchange's failure
to force the member to comply with the exchange's rules. The suit
was brought under section 6 of the 1934 Act. 1 The court noted that
an implied remedy had been found under section 6,2 but nonetheless held that a securities exchange is not liable to a member organization for failure to force the members to comply with its rules.8
The court relied on the first Ash factor finding that, because neither
the Act nor its legislative history evidenced any intent to benefit the
members of the exchange," the intended beneficiary class of the
77. See 422 U.S. at 78.
78. See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
79. See, e.g., Lowenfels, supra note 44.
80. 548 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1977).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1976). Section 6 requires that national securities exchanges
enforce their rules against member organizations in order to be registered with the SEC.
82. See New York Stock Exchange v. Sloan, 394 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), quoted
in 548 F.2d at 66.
83. 548 F.2d at 66. The court concluded that if the member has no cause of action, its
receiver cannot have one, since he can assert no more than the member could have. Id. at

67.
84.

Id. at 65.
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1934 Act was restricted to public investors. Lank illustrates that the
first Ash factor may be properly used in resolving the standing issue
even when no question of implying a right of action is present.
In Abrahamson v. Fleschner5 limited partners in an investment
partnership sought damages from the partnership, its accountants,
and the general partners for failure to disclose certain information,
allegedly in violation of section 20611 of the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940.11 In determining whether an implied right of action exists
under the Advisers Act, the court implemented the Ash criteria,
finding that (1) plaintiffs, as advisers' clients, were intended beneficiaries of the Advisers Act, (2) the legislative history was silent on
the issue of a private remedy, (3) a failure to recognize a private
remedy would frustrate congressional purpose, since the SEC's resources were insufficient to assure effective regulation," and (4)
although the general jurisdictional provision of the Advisers Act
referred only to suits in equity, it should not be narrowly construed
to preclude a private right of action." The court thus held that there
is an implied right of action under section 206 of the Advisers Act. 0
Having created the private remedy, the court refused to subject
plaintiffs to the purchaser-seller requirement of Blue Chip, reasoning that the Advisers Act does not contain such a requirement, and
that Congress intended to protect advisers' clients irrespective of
whether they purchase or sell shares."1 While Abrahamson has been
criticized,9 2 it suggests a useful approach to the implication problem
85. 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 2253 (1978).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976). Section 206 provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser by use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective
client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as
a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client;
(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this paragraph (4) by
rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such
acts, practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
87. Plaintiffs also claimed under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. The court rejected this claim
because neither the reconstitution of the partnership nor the fraudulent inducement not to
sell plaintiffs' partnership interest constituted the purchase or sale of a security. 568 F.2d at

868.
88. The court stated that an intent to vest the SEC with exclusive enforcement of the
securities laws will not be readily made, distinguishing Barbour.Id. at 874 n.19.
89. Id. at 873-76.
90. Id. at 876.
91. Id. at 877.
92. One commentator suggested that the remedy created was unduly broad and failed
to provide necessary limitations, imposing a potentially excessive liability on advisers and
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by clarifying the distinction between implying a private remedy and
allowing a particular plaintiff a cause of action under that remedy.
The opinion also provides alternative relief for plaintiffs foreclosed
by the increasing barriers erected in section 10(b) actions.
In Redington v. Touche Ross & Co." plaintiffs, a trustee in
liquidation and the SIPC,11 sought damages under section 17 of the
1934 Act'5 from an accounting firm for preparing false and misleading certifications of a broker's financial condition." In determining
whether a private cause of action exists under section 17, the court
7
first determined that the section imposes a duty on accountants.
As in A brahamson,the court applied the Ash factors and found that
(1) section 17 and the rules promulgated thereunder were intended
to protect brokers' customers, (2) the legislative history was silent
on whether a private remedy should be implied," (3) since reliance
on accountants' reports is necessary under section 17, a private
remedy is essential to supplement the enforcement scheme of that
section," and (4) since federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
opening the federal courts to extensive litigation. 30 VAND. L. Rzv. 905, 920 (1977).
93. [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,404 (2d Cir. April 21, 1978).
94. See note 46 supra.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1976). In 1972, the date relevant to Redington, this section provided in part:
(a) Every national securities exchange, every member thereof, every broker or
dealer who transacts a business in securities through the medium of any such member,
every registered securities association, and every broker or dealer registered pursuant to
section 780 of this title, shall make, keep, and preserve for such period, such accounts,
correspondence, memoranda, papers, books, and other records, and make such reports,
as the Commission by its rules and regulations may prescribe as necessary and appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. Such accounts. . . shall be
subject at any time or from time to time to such reasonable periodic, special, or other
examinations by examiners or other representatives of the Commission as the Commission may deem necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
96. SIPC sought to recover $14 million, either as subrogee of the broker's customers or
as a member of a group directly injured by defendant. The trustee claimed damages of $51
million, either on behalf of the broker's customers or on behalf of the broker. The court ruled
that SIPC could not sue in its own right, since its interests were not protected under section
17, but that it could sue as subrogee of the customers. The trustee's action on behalf of the
broker was deemed barred by Chris-Craftand Lank, since the broker was precisely the entity
sought to be regulated. The court held, however, that such considerations did not prevent
the trustee's action as bailee of the customers' property. [Current] FED. SEC.L. REP. (CCH),
at 93,435-36.
97. Id. at 93,433. The legislative history, however, reveals no desire on the part of
Congress to create a legal obligation for accountants under § 17 of the Act. See 28 VAND. L.
REv. 269, 277 n.52 (1975).
98. [Current] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH), at 93,434. The court reaffirmed its rule in
Abrahamson that exclusive enforcement by the SEC will not be readily implied. Id.; see note
88 supra.
99. The court noted the usefulness of the SEC amicus brief insofar as it indicated that
the SEC lacks the resources to audit all the reports filed pursuant to § 17 and consequently
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over the Act, a private remedy would not be one traditionally relegated to state law. Having thus determined that the remedy sought
satisfied the Ash criteria for implication of a private right of action
the court next considered whether section 18100 of the 1934 Act and
the Blue Chip doctrine'0 1 barred plaintiffs' claim. Section 18 creates
a private remedy for misleading statements in any report or document filed pursuant to the Act for any person who purchases or sells
a security at a price affected by the misleading statement. The court
observed that any misstatement in a section 17 broker's report
would not affect the price of shares, and that a strict application of
section 18 would therefore leave brokers' customers without remedy.
Reasoning that Congress could not have intended such a result, the
court found that section 18 did not provide the exclusive remedy for
section 17 violations. Furthermore, the court held the purchaser or
seller requirement inapplicable to customers. Thus brokers' customers were held to have a right of action against accountants for certifications that violate the standard set by section 17 and rule 17a-5. 20
Although the opinion is troublesome because it fails to address the
obvious trend in recent Supreme Court decisions0 3 toward restricting the scope of implied rights of action, it is nonetheless important
as the first decision to imply a private right of action for damages
under section 17.
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLIED REMEDY UNDER SECTION

17

Justificationfor an Implied Private Right of Action Under
Section 17

In view of the rule announced in Amtrak, "4 the initial question
raised by the implication of a private remedy under section 17 is
whether section 18 provides the exclusive remedy for section 17
violations. 0 5 The Redington court answered in the negative, pointing out that brokers' customers could never meet the requirements
must accept the vast majority of the audits at face value. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH),
at 93,434 n.12.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976).
101. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
102. [Current] FAt. SEc. L. REP. (CCH), at 93,435.
103. The court cursorily dismissed the holdings in Barbour,Ash, and Amtrak on the
ground that in those cases, intent to commit exclusive enforcement to public agencies was
either implicit or explicit in the statutes. Id. at 93,434.
104. The existence of an express remedy under a statute creates a presumption against
implying additional remedies. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
105. The district court answered this question affirmatively and thus concluded that
no private remedy could be implied from section 17. Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 428 F.
Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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of that section because they cannot qualify as purchasers or sellers
and because misstatements in section 17 reports cannot influence
the prices of securities invested for the customers. This analysis is
correct assuming that one of the purposes of section 17 is to protect
brokers' customers. Although section 17 appears prophylactic and
regulatory in nature, it should be construed as directed toward customers' protection. Otherwise, the section's requirement that the
SEC examine reports only "as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest, or for the protection of investors" is meaningless.0 8 Furthermore, once section 17 fails in its prophylactic purpose, as it did
in Redington, it must become remedial in order to achieve its regulatory goals.' °7 Thus, because section 18 does not provide the protection to brokers' customers intended by section 17, it should not be
construed to limit the scope of the section 17 remedy.
Although the court's application of the Ash factors fails to adequately discuss and distinguish' 8 recent Supreme Court decisions
that either refused to imply a private remedy' or severely restricted
the scope of recognized implied actions," 0 it nonetheless follows an
appropriate approach to implication analysis and reaches the correct result. As in Abrahamson, the Second Circuit properly separated the question of implying a private remedy from the task of
defining the elements of a cause of action under the remedy. Implication of a private remedy under section 17 is justifiable on several
broad policy grounds. The rules promulgated by the SEC pursuant
to section 17 require that brokers retain accountants to audit and
certify their financial statements, and notify their customers in the
event of "material inadequacies.""' The SEC has asserted that the
certification requirements "constituted a valuable regulatory tool
for the protection of a customer" of a broker-dealer."' Similarly,
the purpose behind the SIPA has been to afford protection to customers in the event their brokers encounter financial difficulties."'
In light of these considerations as well as the fact that the SEC must
106. See note 95 supra.
107. The Supreme Court has consistently viewed the securities laws in general as fundamentally remedial in nature. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128
(1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).

108.
109.
110.
111.

The court did not discuss previous applications of the Ash test.

See text accompanying notes 25-35 supra.
See text accompanying note 79 supra.
17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1977).
112. SEC, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRAMCES OF BROKERS AND DEALERS, H. R.
Doc. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1971).
113. See, e.g., Lohf v. Casey, 466 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1972); SEC v. Alan F. Hughes,
Inc., 461 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972).
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rely on the audits supplied by independent accountants,"' the creation of a private remedy with the concomitant liability imposed
on accountants provides a useful deterrent to false or misleading
certification and thus furthers the regulatory purpose of section 17.
Furthermore, an implied private remedy forms a necessary supplement to enforcement by the SEC in order to eliminate the evils
sought to be prevented by section 17.
B.

Scope of the Section 17 Remedy

The impact of the Redington decision is unclear, primarily because the court did not set forth an appropriate standard for accountant liability under section 17 actions,"' and did not formulate
parameters for standing or for the elements of the cause of action
recognized. In light of the Supreme Court's demonstrated intention
to curtail the scope of implied remedies,1 the new section 17 remedy seems to be clearly restricted to situations highly similar to that
in Redington. Furthermore, in order to avoid the purchaser or seller
standing requirement of Blue Chip and the problem of vexatious
litigation and strike suits," 7 section 17 relief should be available
only upon a showing of actual damages. This in turn means that the
plaintiff class will be restricted to customers of failed brokerage
firms, who can demonstrate a breach of duty on the part of the
auditors. The explicit holding in Barbour precludes customers of
brokers in financial difficulties from attempting to compel the SIPC
to act on their behalf. Similarly, customers will be foreclosed from
seeking injunctive relief against failing brokers absent a showing of
irreparable harm."" In addition, although the holding in Hochfelder
is based on statutory construction of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5,
an allegation of scienter will probably be required in an action
against accountants under section 17, especially since the duty of
accountants under section 10(b) in Hochfelder was based on an
interpretation of rules promulgated under section 17."1 Such a requirement is desirable because it will tend to discourage speculative
actions and to protect accountants' from incurring potentially de114. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
115. The court remanded this question to the district court. [Current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH), at 93,436.
116. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
117. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
118. See notes 62-65 supra and accompanying text.
119. See note 55 supra.
120. For a discussion of the role of accountants under the securities laws, see Burton,
SEC Enforcement and ProfessionalAccountants: Philosophy, Objectives and Approach, 28
VAND. L. REv. 19 (1975).
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structive penalties . 2 Finally, since the primary responsibility for
protecting brokers' customers lies with the SIPC, the scope of the
private remedy under section 17 should be narrowly construed to
limit the federal courts' role as an additional arm of the Securities
and Exchange Commission. These restrictions on the scope of a
section 17 private right of action would have the desirable effect of
allowing a remedy for a wrongful injury, without the multiple problems presented by regulation by the judiciary.
V.

CONCLUSION

The approach adopted by the Second Circuit should provide a
useful framework for other federal courts confronted with the issue
of whether a statute implies a private cause of action, as private
litigants search for alternative forms of relief following the curtailment of the scope of traditional implied remedies. While the section
17 right of action is apparently limited to a relatively small class of
potential litigants, the structured and vigorous application of the
Ash implication doctrine suggested by the Second Circuit exemplifies the approach that should be applied to other provisions of the
securities laws. When confronted with claims for relief under these
statutes, federal courts should strive to develop this type of rigorous
analytical framework, clearly distinguishing the three major issues
normally present-whether a right of action may be implied under
the statute, whether plaintiffs have standing to assert a claim under
the statute, and whether their claim is consistent with the right of
action implied. Until Congress enacts clearly articulated standards
for private remedies under the securities statutes, this analytical
approach will assist courts in evaluating implication claims and will
also provide guidance to private litigants considering instituting
such actions.
ANDREw BOR
121.

See note 96 supra.

